DATA:

- ANALYSIS OF ALL TWEETS AND RETWEETS MENTIONING ONE OF THE MAIN GERMAN POLITICAL PARTIES FROM JANUARY 4 TO 16, 2025.
- 475 391 TWEETS ANALYZED
- ISSUED BY 132 101 TWITTER/X ACCOUNTS
- DATA PROVIDED BY VISIBRAIN

brankogrimsx1

elonmusk

afd

hermanntertsch

SPAMBOTS
AND THOUSAND OF NEWLY
CREATED ACCOUNTS TO
PROMOTE THE AFD X ELON
MUSK MEETING!

GERMAN 2025 ELECTIONS AN X ANALYSIS

spdde fdp
cdu
die_gruenen

dielinke

THE STUDY

ANALYSIS OF THE POSSIBLE PRESENCE
OF INFORMATION MANIPULATION
REGARDING THE GERMAN 2025
ELECTIONS

USING MAPPING, WE IDENTIFIED THE COMMUNITIES INVOLVED AND THEIR CLAIMS

LEGAL ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON THE FINDINGS OF THE STUDY





GERMAN 2025 ELECTIONS AN X ANALYSIS -- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY --

Factual conclusions:

- Through the support of **foreign accounts**, the Alternative für Deutschland (AFD) party has gained an overwhelming visibility advantage, in Germany and at international level, compared to other German political parties.
- However, this support is heavily tainted by illegitimate accounts, as they are non-human and posting hundreds of messages per day. These messages are anti-EU, against aid to Ukraine, opposed to vaccines and to climate policies... and in favor of Elon Musk, Donald Trump, and now the AFD.
- For example, more than 2,000 accounts were created specifically to promote the meeting between Elon Musk and Alice Weidel (AFD leader), and inflate the engagment numbers.
- The analysis of all accounts with illegitimate characteristics (excessive tweeting over extended periods, account creation in waves, etc.) reveals a common thread: they either support the AFD, promote Elon Musk, or criticize other political parties.

Legal conclusions:

- Reverse censorship and persistent artificial amplification of content only pro-AfD or against political parties are the source of X's multiplle violations of the Digital Services Act.
- This calls for the European Commission to adopt the following measures due to the gravity and urgency of the situation:
- --> suspend X immediately and until two weeks after the elections
- --> apply periodic penalties equivalent to 5% of the average daily worldwide turnover for each day of delay in complying with the interim measures
- --> adopt promptly a non-compliance decision and impose on X a fine equating 6% of their 2024 total world turnover
 - --> activate the DSA crisis response mechanism
- --> ensure algorithmic transparency and full access to X's data



Study realised by the Centre for AI & Digital Humanism (Digihumanism.eu)

Digihumanism is a think & do tank which aims to ensure a humanistic governance of artificial intelligence in Europe and beyond. Fostering a digital ecosystem that works for all, based on respect for fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of law, is our mission.

- For further insights & media inquiries, please contact:
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Florent Lefebvre, Digihumanism Chief Data Scientist, florent.lefebvre@flefgraph.com

◆ For access to all data supporting the study, please contact florent.lefebvre@flefgraph.com

For more news, visit our website at <u>www.digihumanism.eu</u>

★To support our action and donate, please contact karine@digihumanism.eu



METHODOLOGY:

WE ASK OURSELVES QUESTIONS

WE TRY TO ESTABLISH A PROTOCOL THAT WOULD THEORETICALLY ALLOW US TO ANSWER THEM

WE APPLY THE PROTOCOL

WE TAKE THE RESULTS INTO ACCOUNT (OBEJCTIVITY & NEUTRALITY: WE DON'T THROW ANYTHING AWAY, EVEN IF WE ARE UNHAPPY WITH THE RESULTS)

WE CORRECT AND RE-APPLY THE PROTOCOL, IF NECESSARY, TO EXPLAIN ANY BIAS IN THE RESULTS.

BIS REPETITA UNTIL WE GET THE CLEAREST POSSIBLE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION (OR UNTIL THE END OF THE BUDGET).

First question:
What is the composition of the main political communities in the German ecosystem?
How do they behave?

Second question:
Is there astroturfing aiming to influence the German X ecosystem during this election?
Is there a level playing field among the candidates?
What narratives are set?

DATA COLLECTION:

All data used in this research was provided and offered by Visibrain.

Using their web interface, requests were sent to the Twitter/X API.

This study would not have been possible without their support due to the extremely high cost of the Twitter/X API since 2023 (\$5,000 to \$42,000 monthly for this kind of project).



Create a request for a good sample of the German ecosystem

- For a fair sample of the discourse surrounding the German election, the request targeted all accounts of the major political parties in Germany.
- This request permitted two things: keep the data quantity pretty "low" (not millions of tweets) AND collect data about ALL German political families without bias.

The meaning of the sample

By focusing only on interactions with the official accounts of each political party, the sample emphasises the official political discourse.

In this sample, every tweet provides visibility to a political party, whether by quoting, responding to, or retweeting them. Each tweet carries political meaning and impact.

This approach enables the study to analyse the overall discourse on Twitter/X and assess the presence (or absence) of non-human content attempting to influence the ecosystem by amplifying one political group at the expense of others.



REQUEST USED FOR THE RESEARCH

@AFD
TO:AFD
FROM:AFD
@SPDDE
TO:SPDDE
FROM:SPDDE
@CDU
TO:CDU
FROM:CDU
@DIE_GRUENEN
TO:DIE_GRUENEN
FROM:DIE_GRUENEN
FROM:FDP
FROM:FDP

NOT INCLUDED

@DIELINKE

TO:DIELINKE

FROM: DIELINKE



First question:

What is the composition of the main political communities in the German ecosystem? How do they behave?


Protocol:

- Map all interactions around the German political parties.
- Use the bio and content of the tweets to determine who they support.




BASIC RULES OF MAPPING:

- 1. Every account is represented by a circle labeled with its name.
- 2. Two circles can be connected by a link when they share an interaction analyzed in the mapping (e.g., A retweet or respond to B).
- 3. The size of a circle is proportional to a studied characteristic of the account (e.g., the number of likes).




4 - Placement: Two connected circles attract each other, while unconnected circles repel each other.



5 - Clustering: An algorithm (Louvain) identifies groups of accounts that interact closely with each other. To each group, a specific color is assigned.

A group can be called a "community", and represent mostly a shared audience between channels.



6 - Final rendering made with Gephi - The Open Graph Viz Platform (Open source)

GERMAN 2025 ELECTIONS PRESENT HERE: 132 101 X ACCOUNTS AN X ANALYSIS LINKED BY 475 391 TWEETS AND RT • 1 MAJOR COMMUNITIES (BLUE) 5 MINOR COMMUNITIES (PURPLE, TEAL, RED, GREEN AND ORANGE) THE SIZE OF AN ACCOUNT IS BASED ON THE NUMBER OF LIKES RECEIVED IN THE TWEETS PRESENT IN THE DATASET spdde brankogrimsx1 cdu die gruenen elonmusk afd dielinke hermanntertsch LINK TO THE HD VERSION: HTTPS://WWW.EASYZOOM.COM/IMAGEACCESS/49D 94E9O9FCF4FACA754EDO78D5AC4FF?SHOW-ANNOTATIONS = FALSE NOTE: TO RESPECT THE PRIVACY OF NON-PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, HD VERSION LABELS ARE DISPLAYED

MORE THAN 500 LIKES, AND LINKS ARE HIDED.

GERMAN 2025 ELECTIONS AN X ANALYSIS HOW DOES EACH COMMUNITY PRESENT ITSELF? THE MOST FREQUENT WORDS IN ACCOUNT BIOS BY COMMUNITY. brankogrimsx1 MOST USED WORDS IN THIS COMMUNITY BIOS: MAGA, TRUMP, LIFE, CRYPTO, GOD elonmusk afd hermanntertsch

FREIHEIT (FREEDOM),
LEBEN (LIFE),
POLITIK (POLITICS),
SATIRE,
NAFO (NORTH ATLANTIC FELLAS
ORGANIZATION, OFTEN USED IN
PRO-UKRAINE CONTEXTS)



spdde fdp

cdu

die_gruenen

dielinke

LINKE (POLITICAL LEFT),
SATIRE,
FREIHEIT (FREEDOM),
LEBEN (LIFE),
DIELINKE (POLITICAL PARTY),
POLITIK (POLITICS)

BITCOIN,
FREIHEIT (FREEDOM),
FDP (POLITICAL PARTY),
LIBERAL,
POLITIK (POLITICS)

TEAMHABECK,
FCKAFD (DEROGATORY TERM
AGAINST THE AFD PARTY),
FREIHEIT (FREEDOM),
LEBEN (LIFE),
WIRSINDMEHR (WE ARE
MORE),

TEAMHABECK,
FREIHEIT (FREEDOM),
LEBEN (LIFE),
POLITIK (POLITICS),
FCKAFD (DEROGATORY TERM
AGAINST THE AFD PARTY)




Every community is structured around a specific party.

THE BLUE COMMUNITY, AROUND THE AFD, IS THE ONLY ONE TO BENEFIT FROM THE SUPPORT OF MOSTLY A NON-GERMAN AND INTERNATIONAL AUDIENCE.

Their interactions come mostly from people outside of Germany, with many Pro-MAGA ("Make america great again", pro-Trump movement).

The biggest accounts, with the most likes received on their tweets, are by far the AfD and Elon Musk.





SUMMARY OF TWEETS FROM EACH COMMUNITY BY CHATGPT.


To understand the essence of the "mass" of tweets, we need to use tools, as no one can realistically read nearly 500 000 tweets.

Here, a sample of 1000 tweets from each community is provided to ChatGPT for a summary.

A new ChatGPT session is used for each summary, with the same prompt given each time, as follows:

THIS IS A SAMPLE OF COMMENTS FROM A COMMUNITY ON TWITTER.
WHAT DO THEY SAY ABOUT CURRENT GERMAN POLITICS, ELECTIONS, OR CANDIDATES?
THE RESPONSE MUST BE CONTAINED IN 3 MAIN POINTS OR LESS, BE KEPT SHORT, AND INDICATE IF THE SAMPLE IS NEUTRAL OR MOSTLY PRO OR AGAINST ONE POLITICAL SIDE.

For clarity and concision, the focus has been placed on a brief summary for the main communities (but a long summary and data for all communities are available upon request).





SUMMARY OF TWEETS FROM EACH MAIN COMMUNITY BY CHATGPT.

MORE DETAILED DATA AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST

brankogrimsx1

elonmusk

afd

1. PRO-AFD SENTIMENT DOMINATES: STRONG SUPPORT FOR AFD AND ALICE WEIDEL, FRAMING THEM AS GERMANY'S SAVIORS.

- 2. CRITICISM OF MAINSTREAM POLITICS:
 ESTABLISHED PARTIES AND MEDIA ACCUSED
 OF FAILURE AND CENSORSHIP.
- 3. AFD AS A VOICE FOR CHANGE: EMPHASIS ON FREEDOM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND ECONOMIC REFORM.

hermanntertsch

LEADERSHIP, SEEN AS INEFFECTIVE AND ALIGNED WITH POPULISM.

2. MIXED VIEWS ON THE GREENS: SUPPORT FOR THEIR CLIMATE AGENDA, BUT CRITICISM FOR

ECONOMIC IMPACT.

3.STRONG ANTI-AFD SENTIMENT: WIDESPREAD CONDEMNATION OF THE AFD AS EXTREMIST.

1. CRITICISM OF CDU AND MERZ: SIGNIFICANT

OPPOSITION TO FRIEDRICH MERZ'S

SENTIMENT: MOSTLY NEGATIVE TOWARD CDU AND AFD, MIXED FOR GREENS.

die_gruenen

spdde

cdu

dielinke

- 1. ANTI-CONSERVATIVE SENTIMENT: STRONG CRITICISM OF CDU AND AFD, ESPECIALLY ON IMMIGRATION AND SOCIAL COHESION.
 - SUPPORT FOR LEFTIST POLICIES: ADVOCACY FOR WEALTH REDISTRIBUTION, TENANT PROTECTIONS, AND WORKER RIGHTS, WITH BACKING FOR DIE
- 3. POLICE CRITICISM: ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST LEFTIST FIGURES FUEL CONCERNS ABOUT AUTHORITARIANISM.

TONE: MOSTLY ANTI-RIGHT-WING, PRO-LEFTIST.

TONE: PREDOMINANTLY PRO-AFD.



SUMMARY OF TWEETS FROM EACH MAJOR COMMUNITY BY CHATGPT.

MORE DETAILED DATA AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST

- 1. CRITICISM OF THE AMPEL COALITION:
 WIDESPREAD DISSATISFACTION WITH SPD,
 GREENS, AND FDP, CITING GOVERNANCE AND
 ECONOMIC FAILURES.
- 2. POLARISED PARTISAN ATTACKS: CDU, SPD, GREENS, AND AFD FACE STRONG CRITICISM ON POLICIES, LEADERSHIP, AND CONTROVERSIES.
- 3. ELECTION DYNAMICS: DOUBTS ABOUT FDP'S VIABILITY AND MIXED REACTIONS TO SPD AND GREENS' CAMPAIGNS.

TONE: MOSTLY NEGATIVE, NO CLEAR SUPPORT FOR ANY SIDE.



- 1. PRO-MARKET, ANTI-TAX: STRONG FDP OPPOSITION TO TAX INCREASES ON CAPITAL GAINS AND SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC FREEDOM; CRITICISM OF GREENS' POLICIES AS HARMFUL TO SAVERS.
- 2. COALITION TENSIONS: FDP BLAMES SPD/SCHOLZ AND GREENS FOR ECONOMIC MISMANAGEMENT, ADVOCATING FOR A CDUFDP ALLIANCE.
- 3. PROGRESSIVE POLICY BACKLASH: CRITICISM OF GENDER LAWS AND LEFT POLICIES, EMPHASISING TRADITIONAL LIBERAL AND ECONOMIC VALUES.

TONE: MOSTLY PRO-FDP, ANTI-GREEN/SPD.

- 1. PRO-GREEN SENTIMENT: STRONG SUPPORT FOR ROBERT HABECK AND DIE GRÜNEN, FOCUSING ON SOCIAL JUSTICE, CLIMATE ACTION, AND LEADERSHIP POTENTIAL.
- 2. CRITICISM OF GREENS AND OTHERS: SOME SEE THE GREENS AS OVERLY IDEOLOGICAL OR HARMFUL TO WORKERS; CDU AND AFD ALSO FACE CRITICISM FOR POLICIES AND EXTREMISM.

POLARISED TONE: MOSTLY PRO-GREEN, BUT WITH NOTABLE OPPOSITION FROM CRITICS.



SUMMARY OF TWEETS FROM EACH MAJOR COMMUNITY BY CHATGPT. MORE DETAILED DATA AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST

The discourse in each community is coherent with the official political account in its center.


Most communities talk about the political party concerned, mostly pro but with some strong oppositions.

This describes an ecosystem with people debating about political topics, and mentioning one side or the other when it is relevant.

EXCEPT for the Blue/AFD. It is the only community where:

- No opposition seems to be relevant in the sample
- Most of the topics are purely promoting the party and its leader.

This kind of behaviour is akin more to a promotional campaign for the AFD, than to a typical ecosystem where people talk and debate.



1ST CONCLUSION

GERMAN 2025 ELECTIONS AN X ANALYSIS



First question:

What is the composition of the main political communities in the German ecosystem? How do they behave?

Results:

Most political parties have a notable audience and generate significant numbers of views, comments, and interactions. However, there is a manifest discrepancy in terms of composition among the political communities. The AFD has a much bigger account with clear messaging without opposition.

Organic Behavior in Most Parties:

Most parties exhibit organic behaviours characterised by active debates, discussions on micro-topics, diverse leadership, and opposition.

Distinctive Behaviour in the AFD Community:

- + Significant support from sources outside the German ecosystem which increase the AFD visibility.
- + A lack of meaningful opposition or debates within the most visible content.
- + An audience predominantly focused on sharing content published by a small group of AFD leaders and allies.
- + As we shall see in the second part of the analysis, half the community members only engage in retweeting, without generating any original posts.



Second question:

Is there astroturfing aiming to influence the German X ecosystem during this election?
What narratives do they set?

Protocol:

- Check the norm
- Check users or messages that deviate the most from the norm (spam, copy-past...)
- Check their contents



RATIO ACCOUNTS/TWEETS

By analysing the composition and activity of each community, two behaviours emerge:


• Ratio: tweets > accounts Most communities have many original tweets (all posts except simple retweets) but significantly fewer accounts.

This suggests that most accounts posted multiple tweets mentioning a German political party.

Ratio: accounts > tweets
 In contrast, the AfD community has over 10
 times the number of accounts compared to all other communities combined, with a similar number of original tweets.

This indicates either that most AFD-associated accounts posted only one tweet, or focused primarily on retweeting rather than creating new content.

Each statistical difference has to be analysed, and can indicate some kind of astroturfing (in electoral context, deceptive practice of hiding the sponsors of an orchestrated message or organisation to influence public opinion).



2:23:11 365,7 k vues

🦺 Alice Weidel 🐶 @Alice_Weidel

1 □ 2 k

Klartext mit Alice Weidel: Live aus Hamburg!

🛡 10 k


ılı 208 k


The difference between the statistics at the community scale and the content analysed reveals significant discrepancies.


Further investigation suggests evidence of "non-organic" behavior within the AFD community:

- Half of the community members only engage in retweeting, without generating any original content.
- Some accounts are extremely recent and appear to have been created solely for the purpose of retweeting content from AFD leaders.

This "non-organic" behavior is the focus of this second part of the study on the German 2025 elections.











AVERAGE NUMBER OF POSTS PER DAY SINCE THE USER ACCOUNT CREATION

The norm:

The average user in this study has 19 tweets or retweets per day since the account creation


The top 1%:

The top 1% (1,239 accounts) averages 321 tweets or retweets per day since their creation!

This equates to approximately 1 tweet every 5 minutes, around the clock, day and night, every single day since their creation.

Such activity **CANNOT BE ORGANIC** or managed by a human.

More than 95% of these non-organic accounts are in the AFD community!



The 500 most actives accounts are all above 600 tweets per day (nearly 1 tweet each 2 minutes, around the clock).

AVERAGE NUMBER OF POSTS PER DAY SINCE THE USER ACCOUNT CREATION

GERMAN 2025 ELECTIONS AN X ANALYSIS



Zoom In



ENDLIBTYRANNY (WITH BLUE CHECKMARK) 966 TWEETS PER DAY SINCE 08/2024



HELEN44767171 (WITH BLUE CHECKMARK) 746 TWEETS PER DAY SINCE 2022



AVERAGE NUMBER OF POSTS PER DAY SINCE THE USER ACCOUNT CREATION

GERMAN 2025 ELECTIONS AN X ANALYSIS




All these examples show two things:

- There are bots that produce hundreds of fake contents per day to support Trump, Elon Musk, and in this case the AFD.
- These bots can use a sample of pre-prepared sentences, only emojis, or an IA for a relevant response.

Note:

Most of these bots produce mostly retweets. This lowers the cost.

BASEDSOLUTIONS 1 728 TWEETS PER DAY SINCE 2022





74,8 k abonnements 78,3 k abonnés

TAL HUMANISM STATES

Wave of account creation

Accounts are created all the time on X. But there is no reason to create more accounts in January than in the past.

So the presence of a wave of account creation talking about the German elections can indicate the launch of an astroturfing campaign.


Meaning that a "bot factory" is mass-producing new accounts to produce content about this subject.


The norm:

364 accounts talking about the German election were created each week since 2023

The wave:

- An average of 1789 accounts talking about the German election were created each week since 2025.
- 5367 in 17 days.
- Most of them support Elon Musk and the AFD community.







Wave of account creation

Of theses new accounts, 166 of them already have more than 1000 tweets.

Most of these new hyperactive accounts exist only either to support Elon Musk or the AFD.

Even the few 2025 accounts in other "non-AFD" communities quoted other political parties to attack them.

GERMAN 2025 ELECTIONS AN X ANALYSIS

bierunZ

2 896 posts


bierunZ

@BierunZ

Nouveau compte après blocage du compte @bierun Neues Konto nach Sperrung ds Kontos @bierun

A rejoint Twitter en janvier 2025

237 abonnements 76 abonnés



Deshalb liebe ich Hamburg, wo ich 27 Jahre gelebt habe War oft in diesen Räumen 🤥

Ich danke Ihnen @DrBerndBaumann für Ihren unermüdlichen Einsatz für und für die @AfD

Ein frohes Neues Jahr 2025 aus Südwestfrankreich 🎵 🎵 🎈 @MitAktien @VoelzKerstin

Traduire le post






Karin Knechtel

@ElkeFritsche1

O Allemagne A rejoint Twitter en janvier 2025

37 abonnements 174 abonnés

Karin Knechtel






Carolin Bachmann MdB @BachmannMdB · 14h Zeit für die AfD! Zeit für ein "Gefällt mir!"



ta Karin Knechtel a reposté



Emanuel Boeminghaus 🔮 @E_Boeminghaus · 16h



#Google #EU #Content #Disinformation



Wave of account creation

Here is the summary of all tweets made by all accounts created in 2025 by ChatGPT, using the same prompt as for the precedent analysis:

This is a sample of comments from a community on X.

What do they say about current German politics, elections, or candidates?

The response must be contained in 3 main points or less, be kept short, and indicate if the sample is neutral or mostly pro or against one political side.

The response is clear:

These new accounts were created to support the AFD, or to create criticism against other mainstream parties.



Summary of Commentary on German Politics

1. Critical Views of Established Parties:

 Many comments express frustration with mainstream parties such as the CDU, SPD, and Greens. Common criticisms include allegations of corruption, inefficiency, and misguided policies (e.g., energy decisions like nuclear vs. coal). The SPD and Greens face accusations of economic mismanagement and prioritizing ideology over practical solutions.

2. Support for AfD and Right-Wing Policies:

A significant portion of comments display support for the AfD, praising figures like Alice
Weidel and advocating for stricter migration controls, tax reductions, and skepticism toward
climate policies. Some suggest the AfD is the only viable alternative for change and express
hope for its political ascendance.

3. Polarized and Hostile Rhetoric:

The discourse is marked by polarized language, with strong animosity toward opposing
political sides. While some laud AfD for "realistic" and "bold" stances, others use harsh
terms for the Left and Greens, accusing them of hypocrisy or undermining democracy.

Tone:

The sample leans **pro-AfD** and anti-establishment, with criticism heavily focused on mainstream parties and policies.



Wave of account creation

In January 2025, a notable spike of account creation is visible on January 8th and 9th.


These accounts were specifically created to support the public meeting between Alice Weidel (AFD leader) and Elon Musk.

The very first action of most of these newly created accounts was to share, respond to, or quote the announcement of the meeting.

These new accounts only follow Elon Musk and his companies and allies.


GERMAN 2025 ELECTIONS AN X ANALYSIS







Wave of account creation




Helmut Kirr

@KirrHelmut

A rejoint Twitter en janvier 2025

7 abonnements





Gain Breaking News Daily! No Affiliations with @IvankaTrump. Turn on A Notification to be the first to get Breaking News. #Trump2024

AfD Kanzlerkandidatin 2025 | Fraktionsvorsitzende der @AfDimBundestag |

🦍 Ivanka Trump 🔤 角 News 🔮

Alice Weidel 🤡

AfD-Bundessprecherin



🙉 Elon Musk 🐶 🛽 @elonmusk · 8 janv.

Discussion with @AfD leader and possible Chancellor of Germany @Alice_Weidel tomorrow



🥼 Alice Weidel 🤡 @Alice_Weidel · 8 janv.

Morgen ist es soweit! Am morgigen Donnerstag ab 19 Uhr findet der angekündigte Space mit Elon Musk und mir auf X statt.

Only 1 day to go: On January 9th at 1pm EST, the announced Space with Elon Musk and me will go live on X.



Q 5 k

℃ 16 k

♡ 96 k

ılı 9 M

 \Box \triangle



Viel Glück für morgen

Traduire le post

10:19 PM · 8 janv. 2025 · 5 vues

2ND CONCLUSION

GERMAN 2025 ELECTIONS AN X ANALYSIS



Second question:

Is there astroturfing aiming to influence the German 2025 elections X ecosystem during this election? What narratives do they set?

Results:

- Yes! Even aside the legitimate dynamic or strategies of each political community, we can clearly observe thousands of accounts that cannot be human controlled (tweets every few minutes for months, or years), participating in the debates around these elections.
- Most of them supports clearly the AFD.
- An increase of 500% of account creation since 2025 to talk about the German election.
- More than 2000 of these new accounts were created in two days, for the sole purpose to promote and inflate the engagement numbers around the meeting between Elon Musk and Alice Weidel (AFD leader).
- These new accounts follow only people or company supported by Elon Musk (Tesla, SpaceX, Donald Trump, AFD...)
- This pattern is coherent with precedent analysis that established that a large part of Elon Musk's followers are fake or inactive accounts (0 followers, 0 tweets, no bios or profile picture, too few follows...)

 Source: https://mashable.com/article/elon-musk-x-twitter-follower-data



General factual conclusions:

- Elon Musk, through his hyperactive community in the comments across all X communities, provides the AFD with a unique level of impact and an echo chamber effect that extends into the German X ecosystem.
- Beyond his "human communities," thousands of "spambots" have been detected which actively support both Elon Musk and the AFD, producing hundreds of tweets per day.
- Thousands of new accounts are created solely to amplify specific tweets from Elon Musk or the AFD, only to be discarded afterward.
- None of these behaviors are observed in significant quantities within any other communities discussing German politics. When engaging with this subject, these bots or freshly created accounts are either highly praiseworthy of the AFD or intensely critical of all other political parties.
- While the majority of the spambots primarily engaged in retweeting, a significant portion of these bots used AI to generate relevant and credible responses. These responses, however, were detectable solely due to the unsustainable volume of activity that no human could maintain (hundreds by day, every day, during multiple month).
- The cheer number of the "non-organic" accounts and communities boost drastically the visibility of the AFD.

LEGAL ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS

GERMAN 2025 ELECTIONS AN X ANALYSIS



Order X's immediate suspension at least until two weeks after the end of the German elections + periodic penalties

We urge the European Commission to order an **interim measure** with the effect of **immediately suspending** the provision of X's services in Germany, at least until two weeks after the end of the German elections, on the basis of a prima facie finding of an infringement of the Digital Services Act.

X's suspension is both necessary and proportionate due to the risks for democracy.


With less than a month until the German elections, the time to act is now in order to safeguard free and fair elections in Germany and stop reverse censorship and one-sided artificial amplification. This is an urgent matter.

The adoption of an interim measure is the only way to prevent risks of serious damage for the recipients of the service in Germany. This concerns the impact on the outcome of the elections as well as possible civil unrest, right after the elections and possibly against minorities. Both would be very difficult to reverse by a decision taken by the Commission at the end of the proceedings.

Due to the gravity and urgency of the situation, we also urge the European Commission to apply periodic penalties equivalent to 5% of the average daily worldwide turnover for each day of delay in complying with the interim measure.



With regard to civil unrest and election contestation, this is also a matter of national security.



The US President's blanket pardon regarding the Capitol Hill riot following the 2020 US presidential elections sets a dangerous precedent. The Capitol Hill attack aimed to overturn the elections following false claims that the elections were rigged. Twitter was used to disseminate fake news and call on supporters of the candidate who lost the elections to rally and protest on January 6 in DC before the Congressional vote count.

This proves not only the crucial role Twitter/X has played in election interference but the necessity to extend the temporary suspension to the post-election phase.

X's suspension is only temporary and restricted to a period of time, pre- and post elections where the risks for democracy are the highest.

Alternative means to receive and impart information exist and can be used in the meantime in Germany.



Adoption of a DSA non-compliance decision against X:

We urge the European Commission to adopt **promptly** a **non-compliance decision** where it finds that X does not comply with the provisions of the Digital Services Act (DSA) on the basis of this report and other evidence in the Commission's possession.

Imposition of a fine equating 6% of X's total world annual turnover

We urge the Commission to impose on X a **fine amounting to 6 % of their total worldwide annual turnover** in the preceding financial year due to X, intentionally or negligently, infringement of the Digital Services Act.

The severity of the fine is justified by X's multiple violations of the DSA, their scope and gravity, as evidenced by this report, and especially the scope, amount and nature of the systemic risks incurred by German citizens, and the European Union as a whole.

This sanction might serve as an incentive for X to respect their DSA obligations and ensure their full cooperation with European and national institutions. Let's recall that other elections are due to take place in 2025 in the European Union, such as in Romania, Austria, Croatia, Latvia, Poland, Italy, Portugal, Czech Republic, Estonia or Denmark. X's full compliance with the DSA, including through the fulfillment of their due diligence and risk mitigation obligations, will be key in this regard.

Sanction against X's infringement of German voters' right to make a free and informed decision regarding the elections

We urge the European Commission to sanction X's violation of their obligation not to design, organise or operate their online interfaces in a way that deceives or manipulates the recipients of their service or in a way that otherwise materially distorts or impairs the ability of the recipients of their service to make free and informed decisions.

The report has identified:

- a wave of "reverse censorship":
- the submission of X's German users to an information flood through the amplification of pro-AfD and anti-mainstream politics content via bots, with the effect of drowning out other political parties' and their candidates' expression.
- continuous artificial amplification of pro-AfD and anti-mainstrean politics content via bots


These phenomena clearly constitute deceptive or manipulative practices in breach of the DSA.

Our findings are corroborated by the data available on the Bundesdatenschau. It offers a visualisation of how much attention each German political party and politicians receive on X. Through the Bundesdatenschau, it is possible to compare number of impressions, tweets, retweets, likes and replies received over a certain period of time.


The conclusion is that there has been a drastic shift in the AfD's visibility, supported by a number of Retweets and Likes, approx. four times higher than for other parties in January 2025, and despite other parties tweeting or commenting (Replies) more than the AfD.

DATA RETRIEVED FROM THE BUNDESDATENSCHAU

The Bundesdatenschau data show clearly a recent and sharp increase in visibility in favour of the AfD. In terms of number of impressions, the AfD has jumped from the third to the first position with a big discrepancy between the AfD and the other political parties in the covered part of January 2025. Within that period, the AfD got almost 3 times more impressions than the political party in second position.





Number of impressions over a year Period of reference: 28.01.2024-22.01.2025



Number of impressions within two weeks Period of reference: 8.01.2025-22.01.2025

This massive inequality in the covered part of January 2025 in terms of number of impressions is not correlated with the number of Tweets or Replies posted by each political parties. The AfD is still in 3rd position for Tweets or Replies.









However the disproportionately high level of impressions in favour of the AfD is correlated with the number of Retweets and Likes, which are more prone to inflation by bots as analysed in this report.

The AfD, in first position, benefits from more than four times more Retweets than the other political parties in the covered period in January 2025.



The AfD, in first position, benefits from almost four times more Likes than the other political parties in the covered period in January 2025.




This high-level of discrepancy between the AfD and other political parties illustrates both the AfD's inflated visibility and other parties' drowning out, typical of reverse censorship.

Of concern, is the steady increase in the AfD's visibility, disconnected from that of other parties, typical of successful reverse censorship. This wave of reverse censorship coincided with Elon Musk & Alice Weidel discussion on X as analysed in our report and cumulated to 60M views, 2M likes and 300K Retweets based on the Bundesdatenschau data reproduced here for the covered period.



Number (N°) of impressions (Jan. 8-22, 2025)









N° of Retweets

(Jan. 8-22, 2025)




N° of Tweets (Jan. 8-22, 2025)




N° of Replies (Jan. 8-22, 2025)

Jan 21- 24 2025: Amplification period


In the period covered (Jan. 21-Jan. 24), the AfD is a close second in terms of impressions, with a bit over 12M impressions. What distingues it from other parties however is still that this position is supported by a much higher level of Likes (almost 700K) and Retweets (more than 100K), more prone to inflation by bots as analysed in our report.




Number of Impressions Period of reference: 21.01.2024-24.01.2025




Number of Replies
Period of reference: 21.01.2024-24.01.2025



Number of Likes Period of reference: 21.01.2024-24.01.2025



Number of Tweets
Period of reference: 21.01.2024-24.01.2025




Number of Retweets
Period of reference: 21.01.2024-24.01.2025




Zoom in_Jan. 26 2025: Reverse censorship

Data from Jan. 26 2025, right after the AfD campaign event where Elon Musk gave a speech, show again reverse censorship whereby X's German users are submitted to an information flood through the amplification of pro-AfD content, with the effect of drowning out other political parties' and their candidates' expression.


Jan. 26



Number of Impressions Period of reference: 26.01.2025




Number of Retweets Period of reference: 26.01.2025




Period of reference: 26.01.2025


Jan. 27



Number of Impressions Period of reference: 27.01.2025




Number of Retweets Period of reference: 27.01.2025




Number of Likes Period of reference: 27.01.2025

On both Jan. 26 and Jan. 27: massive AfD amplification via Likes and Retweets, similar to what we have observed in our report, though less numerous on Jan. 27.


Difference: in terms of impressions, the AfD drops from 1st postion with 5M Impressions on Jan. 26 to 3rd position with 1M impressions on Jan. 27 with the Greens in 1st position with >2.5M Impressions, half of what the AfD obtained the previous day. This sudden drop can be indicative of artificial boosting.




Number of Replies Period of reference: 26.01.2025



Number of Tweets Period of reference: 26.01.2025



Number of Replies Period of reference: 27.01.2025



Number of Tweets

Period of reference: 26.01.2025



Another deceptive technique: Blue checkmarks as dark patterns

In July 2024, the European Commission already sent preliminary findings to X for breach of the DSA regarding the granting of "verified account" status to inauthentic accounts.

The European Commission found that:

"X designs and operates its interface for the "verified accounts" with the "Blue checkmark" in a way that does not correspond to industry practice and deceives users. Since anyone can subscribe to obtain such a "verified" status, it negatively affects users' ability to make free and informed decisions about the authenticity of the accounts and the content they interact with. There is evidence of motivated malicious actors abusing the "verified account" to deceive users."

In this report, we found evidence of Blue checkmarks granted to inauthentic accounts operating in the framework of the German elections (see slide). We urge the Commission to further investigate, sanction and put a stop to this repeated violation of the DSA.

The use of this deceptive technique further aggravates the risks reverse censorship poses to the integrity of the German elections by confusing German voters regarding what are authentic or inauthentic expression of opinions and biaising debates through amplification of certain political positions to the detriment of others. Pluralism and dialogue, essential conditions for democracy, are being replaced by propaganda and polarisation.

Engagement from "Verified accounts" with the Blue Checkmark" might also increase the AfD's visibility.



X did not respect their obligation not to design, organise or operate their online interfaces in a way that materially distorts or impairs the ability of German recipients of their service, ie German voters, to make free and informed decisions with regard to the elections, the party/candidate for which they will vote.

Reverse censorship and continuous artificial amplification of content, either pro-AfD or against other political parties, at such a scale, impair German voters' ability to make free and informed decisions. German voters are submitted to undue influence via bots, what's more without their knowledge.

Artificial Likes and Retweets not only might increase the visibility of pro-AfD content but it also manufactures the illusion of viral traction, forcing German voters to pay more attention to this kind of content than they would have done otherwise.

This false assumption is even further amplified when German voters are tricked in believing that the source is a human one because it is identifed as a "verified account" with the "Blue Checkmark".

Reverse censorship and persistant artificial amplification, due to their scale and repetition, become agendasetters in terms of key political themes. Information flooding in favour of the AfD also means substantively the prioritization of the AfD's campaign themes. This goes against freedom of information and thought, both protected under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Art. 10 & 11 respectively), at the root of the ability to make free and informed decisions.

GERMAN 2025 ELECTIONS A TWITTER/X ANALYSIS



Sanction X's for granting unfair competitive advantage to the AfD

We urge the European Commission to sanction X for granting an unfair competitive advantage to one of the political parties to the German elections through the configuration of its recommender system.

X did not act as a mere conduit of information transmitted or accessed on their platform. X selected the receivers of the transmission through their recommender system.

Democracy, as the Romanian Constitutional Court recalled when it recently canceled the Romanian presidential elections, is about providing an equality of opportunities among all candidates and political parties.

Through reverse censorship and persistent artificial amplification, this has manifestly not been the case in the context of the German federal elections.



Sanction X's failure to comply with systemic risks assessment obligations

We urge the European Commission to sanction X for failure to diligently identify, analyse and assess the systemic risks in Germany stemming from the design or functioning of their service and their related systems, including algorithmic systems, or from the use made of their services as identified in the report.

The systemic risks concerned are:

- the actual or foreseeable **negative effects on civic discourse and electoral processes** as identified in the report, and relatedly on public security during and after the elections.

 Massive reverse censorship and persistent artificial amplification are a direct threat to the integrity of the elections
- the actual or foreseeable negative effects for the exercise of fundamental rights, in particular the fundamental rights to:
- --> the integrity of the person, in particular **mental integrity** (Article 3 of the EU Charter)
 The forced submission to reverse censorship and persistent artificial amplification can confuse Germans as to what is true or not, what is real or not, or trigger issues of trust or mistrust in the world, fellow humans or institutions.
- --> **freedom of expression** (Article 10 EU of the EU Charter)
 The very definition of reverse censorship means that those not artificially boosted get less visibility. Their freedom of expression is necessarily curtailed. A similar mechanism is at play with persistent artificial amplification through the action of X's recommender system.

--> freedom of thought (Article 10 of the EU Charter

Due to reverse censorship and persistent artificial amplification, Germans have been force-fed on X with unsollicited content pro-AfD or against other political parties. This is a manifest infringement of their freedom of thought without external interference.

--> freedom to receive information (Article 11 of the EU Charter)

The consequence of reverse censorship or persistent artificial amplification is that it upsets the chain of communication of information through the prioritisation via the recommender system of artificially boosted content.

--> high-level of consumer protection (Article 38 of the Charter)

German recipients of X's services are manifestly not offered a high level of protection against reverse censorship or persistent artificial amplification. On the contrary, they are being deceived or manipulated.



In particular, we urge the Commission to sanction X for:

- not taking into account, in particular, whether and how the following factors influence any of the systemic risks mentioned above:
 - --> the design of their recommender systems and any other relevant algorithmic system;
 - --> their content moderation systems;
 - --> the applicable terms and conditions and their enforcement;
 - --> data related practices of the provider
- not analysing whether and how the risks identified below are influenced by intentional manipulation of their service, including by inauthentic use or automated exploitation of the service, as well as the amplification and potentially rapid and wide dissemination of illegal content and of information that is incompatible with their terms and conditions.

We urge X to start conducting immediately such risk assessment, and the European Commission and the Irish Digital Service Coordinator to request the supporting documents of the risk assessment as soon as they are ready.



Sanction of X's failure to mitigate the systemic risks to fundamental rights and democracy

We urge the European Commission to sanction X for failure to put in place reasonable, proportionate and effective mitigation measures, tailored to the specific systemic risks identified above.

In particular, X failed to:

- --> adapt the design, features or functioning of their services, including their online interfaces;
- --> adapt their terms and conditions or their enforcement;
- --> properly test and adapt their algorithmic systems, including their recommender systems;
- --> reinforce the internal processes, resources, testing, documentation, or supervision of any of their activities in particular as regards detection of these systemic risks;
- --> take awareness-raising measures and adapt their online interface in order to give recipients of the service more information



Activation of the crisis response mechanism as a matter of urgency

We urge the European Commission, upon a recommendation of the European Board of Digital Services, to adopt a crisis decision, requiring X to take the following actions:

(a) assess to what extent and how, the functioning and use of their services might significantly contribute to a serious threat to the security of Germany or the European Union.

In this regard, the AfD is currently the object of a procedure of prohibition based on Article 21.2 of the German constitution. (See also the report of the group of 17 constitutionalists)

One of the triggering events was a meeting of some AfD members with members of the Austrian far right, which has adopted "remigration" or massive deportation based on "ethnic" criteria, as a key part of their electoral program. Remigration is now also officially part of the AfD's electoral program (see investigation here).

It is also precisely because of the AfD's stance on migration policy, considered incompatible with the respect for human dignity laid down in the German constitution, that a court in Saxony declared the AfD in Saxony a "right-wing extremist" organisation (see here).

Lastly, according to Article 21.2 of the German constitution, endangerment of democracy is one of the key criteria justifying a ban. Reverse censorship and persistent artificial amplification can be considered as serious threats to democracy. Democracy is defined by the equality of opportunities it provides to candidates.



b) identify and apply specific, effective and proportionate measures, such as any of those provided for in Article 35(1) or Article 48(2) of the Digital Services Act, to prevent, eliminate or limit any such contribution to the serious threat identified pursuant to point (a) of this paragraph;

(c) report to the Commission by a certain date or at regular intervals specified in the decision, on the assessments referred to in point (a), on the precise content, implementation and qualitative and quantitative impact of the specific measures taken pursuant to point (b) and on any other issue related to those assessments or those measures, as specified in the decision.

When identifying and applying measures pursuant to point (b) of this paragraph, X shall take due account of the gravity of the serious threat on public security, of the urgency of the measures and of the actual or potential implications for the rights and legitimate interests of German and Union citizens, including the possible failure of the measures to respect the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter.



We urge the European Commission, when taking their decision, to ensure that:

- the actions required by it take due consideration of the particular gravity of the serious threat to public security, the urgency of the measures and the actual or potential implications for the rights and legitimate interests of German and Union citizens, including the possible failure of the measures to respect the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter
- the decision specifies the **shortest period** within which specific measures are to be taken, to the benefit of Germany and the European Union as whole.

Ensure full access to X's data

We urge the European Commission and the Irish Digital Services Coordinator to request X access to data that are necessary to monitor and assess X (non-) compliance with the Digital Services Act and to grant such access to vetted researchers.

Ensure full algorithmic transparency

We urge the European Commission and the Irish Digital Services Coordinator to request X to explain the design, the logic, the functioning and the testing of their algorithmic systems, including their recommender systems.



Monitor DSA effective implementation and compliance

We urge the European Commission to take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the Digital Services Act by X. We ask the Commission to order X to **provide access to, and explanations relating to, its databases and algorithms.** This includes imposing an obligation on X to **retain all documents** deemed to be necessary to assess the implementation of and compliance with the obligations under the Digital Services Act, on top of the investigatory measures the Commission already addressed to X.

Appointment of independent external experts and auditors

We also ask the Commission to ensure the appointment of independent external experts and auditors, as well as experts and auditors from competent national authorities with the agreement of the authority concerned, to assist the Commission in monitoring the effective implementation and compliance with the relevant provisions of the DSA and to provide specific expertise or knowledge to the Commission.

Provision of information on participating recipients to the German authorities

We urge the German authorities to adopt orders for X to provide information on the recipients of its service who have participated in reverse censorship or persistent artificial amplification.



NOTA BENE:

1/ The legal analysis has conducted on the basis of the Digital Services Act.

It is worth mentioning nevertheless, for future enquiries, that as of February 2025, the provisions of the EU AI Act on prohibited practices have entered into force.

However, one of the general factual conclusions of our report is that: "While the majority of the spambots primarily engaged in retweeting, a significant portion of these bots used AI to generate relevant and credible responses."

Such practices could be considered as prohibited under Article 5 a) or b) of the EU AI Act, provisions which have entered into force in February 2025.

2/ Congruent with our report, only the Bundesdatenschau data related to political parties were used. However, it is worth noting that similar observations to those formulated regarding the AfD could be formulated with regard Alice Weidel's X account. (See here)

This means that reverse censorship and persistent artificial amplification are actually bigger phenomena that we have observed, were accounts of both political parties and party leaders taken into account.